EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cities, states, and metropolitan areas across the United States are looking to invest in a range of public transit projects in order to connect people to jobs and economic opportunity, reduce greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles, and shape development patterns.
According to one estimate, the United States invested about $50 billion in new transit projects in just the last decade.
These include underground subways in Los Angeles, commuter rail lines along the Front Range near Denver, a streetcar in downtown Atlanta, light rail lines in suburban Phoenix, and bus rapid transit in Richmond, Virginia, among many others.
While these projects are as diverse as the country itself, they all have one thing in common: increased scrutiny over their costs and timelines to build. A few very visible projects have reinforced the narrative that rail transit investments have systemic issues that are endemic to the United States.
This all begs the questions:
Is this true? If so, why? And what should we do about it?
These are precisely the questions Eno set out to answer through this research, policy, and communications project to analyze current and historical trends in public transit project delivery. We convened a set of advisors and conducted in-depth interviews with key stakeholders to understand the drivers behind mass transit construction, cost, and delivery in the United States. A comprehensive database of rail transit projects was created and curated to compare costs and timelines among U.S. cities and peer metropolitan areas in Western Europe and Canada. Through this quantitative and qualitative approach, we developed actionable recommendations for policy changes at all levels of government as well as best practices for the public and private sectors.
UNDERSTANDING COSTS AND TIMELINES
Eno’s Construction Cost Database of 180 domestic and international public transit projects completed since 2000 shows that the United States pays a premium of nearly 50 percent on a per-mile basis to build transit for both primarily at-grade and primarily tunneled projects. The tunneling premium in the United States rises to roughly 250 percent when New York City’s disproportionately expensive projects are included.
Tunneled projects are not only less expensive abroad, but also more common. Just under 12 percent of U.S. rail transit projects represented in our database were constructed primarily below ground, compared to 37 percent of non-U.S. projects. In fact, many international projects constructed below grade have similar costs to those that are at-grade in the United States. For example, Toulouse, France’s 9.3 mile Metro Line B was built entirely underground at a cost of about $176 million per mile while Houston Metro’s 3.2 mile Green Line is all at-grade and cost $223 million per mile.
Despite their lower construction costs, international projects are often more complex than similar lines in the United States. They tend to have more stations that are built closer together than U.S. projects, often run through crowded historic city centers, and usually share street space with cars and other vehicles. Rail projects in the United States tend to be routed along “paths of least resistance” such as freight rail or highway corridors, rather than dense areas where transit would make the most sense for riders or communities. Of course, this is not always the case. Seattle’s 1 Line corridor traverses well-developed urban areas and operates in a tunnel between the University of Washington and downtown. But many U.S. transit projects resemble Minneapolis’ Blue Line, whose mostly at-grade alignment along existing right-of-way was specifically intended to limit impacts on the local community and minimize the need to acquire private property.
Even with more straightforward alignments, U.S. projects with minimal tunneling still take about six months longer to construct than similar non-U.S. projects. U.S. projects that are almost all underground take nearly a year and a half longer to build than abroad. The time it takes to construct a transit project is also highly correlated with its cost, reinforcing the aphorism “time is money.”
RESEARCH METHODS
With an understanding that transit projects in the United States do suffer from high costs and take longer to complete than they do abroad, it is important to investigate the “why.” To do so, we conducted a thorough examination of existing literature and research and interviewed 117 professionals with both intimate knowledge of specific projects or regions and transit project delivery expertise generally. We also conducted detailed case studies of project delivery in four domestic regions (Los Angeles, Seattle, Denver, and Minneapolis) and four international regions (Copenhagen, Madrid, Paris, and Toronto) to help identify real-world examples of cost and timeline drivers for transit projects as well as best practices. We also compared a transit project to a highway project in Virginia to compare how regulatory processes, project delivery practices, institutional support, and governance differ across modes.
Through our literature review and case studies, one clear finding emerged: there is not one, easily identifiable reason for high costs or delivery delays. Rather, we identified a dozen drivers of transit construction costs and timelines that fall into three overlapping and interrelated categories: governance, processes, and standards. These findings form the basis of our resulting recommendations and best practices to deliver transit projects quicker and more cost-effectively.
There is not one, easily identifiable reason for high costs or delivery delays.
Rather, we identified a dozen drivers of transit construction costs and timelines that fall into three overlapping and interrelated categories:
POLICY AND PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS
The responsibility for cutting costs and timelines for transit projects does not rest solely on federal reforms, fixes at the agency level, or with private sector practice. Rather, the challenges are acute, complex, and multi-faceted. The solutions are, too. The recommendations below are based on that fundamental premise. Click each one to see further details.
Governance
First, we need to get the institutions, oversight, and decision-making right.
The public institutions charged with leading the delivery of transit projects need authority, staff, and good governance to move them forward.
Today in the United States, transit projects are delivered almost exclusively through existing entities. Public transit agencies are institutions that were designed as operating entities often to pick up the operation of struggling bus lines from private companies decades ago. Setting a clear structure for organizational decision-making responsibility, as well as coordination with other agencies and transportation modes, is critically important to the success of a transit project. The successful, low-cost expansion of Madrid’s metro system between 1995 and 2003 provides a clear example of how small, multi-disciplinary internal management teams can deliver projects effectively when they are empowered to address issues as they arise. In Denver, a delegated authority approach for the region’s FasTracks system expansion led to faster turnarounds on key decisions and fewer project delays.
Our research shows that independent, special purpose delivery vehicles (SPDV) are an attractive option to manage construction before handing the ownership and operation back to the public agency. States or regions need to create a temporary, independent SPDV, or modify an existing institution, with the necessary authorizations and abilities to manage and focus on the most complex of projects. Institutions responsible for project delivery need to be self-permitting, should be able to issue debt (if necessary), use eminent domain to acquire land, relocate utilities, as well as enter into contracts and agreements with public and private entities. Governing boards should be made up of funders and the relevant other stakeholders that are necessary to push the project forward. The organization should also have the ability to set salaries to attract and hire top project management talent and borrow staff from existing institutions. For its part, the FTA should encourage project sponsors to reform governance, authorizations, and other factors as part of receiving federal funds.
Project sponsors need to understand, manage, and commit to whatever project delivery method is most appropriate for the project.
Anecdotally, many experts have a preferred method for delivering projects. Some swear by traditional approaches, like design-bid-build while others prefer design-build or partnerships with private partners. Our work makes clear that no single delivery method on its own is a panacea for cost and timeline issues. Rather, agencies’ commitment to a delivery method and understanding of how to manage it is essential.
Project sponsors need to adopt a formal evaluation process to determine the appropriate procurement method on a project-by-project basis. Once a specific procurement method is selected, the project sponsor should commit to it and manage it accordingly.
Projects need to be developed smartly so contracts are not too large to be effectively managed, procurement goals are realistic, and the best value is returned for public dollars.
Anecdotally, many experts have a preferred method for delivering projects. Some swear by traditional approaches, like design-bid-build while others prefer design-build or partnerships with private partners. Our work makes clear that no single delivery method on its own is a panacea for cost and timeline issues. Rather, agencies’ commitment to a delivery method and understanding of how to manage it is essential.
Project sponsors need to adopt a formal evaluation process to determine the appropriate procurement method on a project-by-project basis. Once a specific procurement method is selected, the project sponsor should commit to it and manage it accordingly.
Agency staff need appropriate training in order to manage projects, construction staff, and consultants.
Overburdened and undertrained public agency staff have trouble coordinating environmental review and planning documents, creating discrete and clear procurement plans, writing smart and effective contracts, and ensuring adherence to contract terms during construction. These all lead to problems with litigation, change orders, and delays throughout a project. Project sponsors need to invest in better training and support for front office staff who are responsible for overseeing, monitoring, and managing projects from inclusion to operation. They should also establish small, multidisciplinary teams of high-quality, experienced executives with control over on-the-spot decisions, and enough junior staff to support them. FTA needs to work with project sponsors to more precisely determine their workforce needs for project delivery management and oversight
In addition, this research found that the unionized, frontline construction workforce is not a primary target for cost or timeline efficiencies on major projects domestically or abroad. Project sponsors should, however, establish equitable project labor agreements (PLAs) as a valuable way to avoid worker strife by providing clear arrangements for dispute resolution, pre-approved compensation, and work rules. Labor leaders should be at the table at the beginning of project development in order to address potential concerns early on, create flexibility in work rules and overtime, as well as establish a shared understanding about conflict resolution and scheduling to keep projects moving efficiently and safely.
Processes
Second, some of the processes, procedures, and practices that public and private actors must undertake in order to build transit projects—from conception to final completion— are often too slow, cumbersome, or outdated. We need to make it easier to build more and better transit projects.
The federal NEPA statute does not need to be reformed, but the processes by which federal agencies reach a record of decision does.
NEPA is an important part of making sure that projects are transparent about their potential impacts to the built and natural environment, the air, and the communities affected. It is one of the few mandated opportunities for historically underrepresented communities to provide input into projects. It is also, however, subject to an uncoordinated, duplicative, and convoluted process. Although environmental rules, regulations, and requirements in other countries are as just as elaborate, the environmental review processes are generally better streamlined, and approval is obtained faster than in the United States. Many of the challenges with NEPA are attributed to misunderstandings and conflicts between agencies. Early and consistent coordination between agencies during planning and environmental assessment would undoubtedly help foster agreement on issues and avoid delays. Sharing of best practices in environmental assessment between agencies and project sponsors would further help improve common challenges in reaching a record of decision.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), an entity within the Executive Office of the President, should require more regular face-to-face meetings of federal agency field staff involved with preparing environmental documents and require sharing of environmental documents between permitting agencies to cut down on duplicative tasks. The Biden Administration should issue an executive order focusing on better coordination and consolidation of the disparate timelines and processes among the various regulations that fall under the umbrella of NEPA. Once issued, the FTA should execute an agreement with relevant federal agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers and commit to working together in a more frequent, collaborative manner. CEQ should also set up an annual environmental permitting conference to build expertise and allow for exchange of best practices among stakeholders.
To go a step further, the United States can look to Madrid and Ontario, whose respective governments have set up specialized environmental reviews for transit projects. Given the net-positive environmental benefits of transit, Congress should create a pilot program to allow the federal transportation secretary to exempt select public transportation projects from NEPA if sponsors are able to demonstrate that they conducted robust community engagement and evaluation of project alternatives through the planning process. FTA should monitor this pilot program to measure its effectiveness at saving time as well as ensuring environmental protection.
States and project sponsors also need to invest in the staff and processes for their own permitting and environmental review.
Highway projects interact with the environmental review process more regularly given how routinely the United States builds roadway projects. To lean on their deep expertise, transit project sponsors should borrow staff from state departments of transportation (DOTs) and the federal highway administration (FHWA) to assist with preparing environmental documents. Transit project sponsors should take advantage of revised federal regulations to no longer require the evaluation of “all reasonable alternatives” and instead examine only those alternatives deemed feasible. Congress should also dedicate more resources to the FTA to increase staffing in their regional offices and help assist transit agencies with preparing and coordinating environmental documents.
But since state laws and regulations are often as complicated and suffer from the same siloed nature as federal permits, states should set up their own entities similar to the Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council. If structured correctly, they would help local agencies navigate state environmental regulations and coordinate between various state and federal staff.
The planning and community stakeholder engagement process needs greater investment and more attention.
Despite their efforts, project sponsors generally invest too little in early planning and public outreach, and still employ outdated tools. Project sponsors need to dedicate more staff and resources to working directly with communities and secure scope agreements as early as possible during the project planning stage to prevent disagreements and issues from causing delays and issues further into a project. In doing so, sponsors should employ non-traditional forms of public engagement including opportunities to provide virtual feedback, having smaller meetings in individual communities (rather than the traditionally large, informal public meetings held in an auditorium), and hosting meetings at non-traditional hours.
Project sponsors should work with the community to recognize trade-offs and push for greater short-term disruption to advance construction faster. Agency staff also need to be more empowered to make tough decisions on project scope and requests through a transparent process, with public sector planners documenting all comments to demonstrate how they inform an agency’s final decisions. Staff should take care to respond to every comment, document why certain options regarding project scope were advanced or taken off the table, and show how decisions were made with public input and social equity top of mind.
Policy and practice reforms are needed to address significant shortcomings related to utility relocation and land acquisition.
Utility relocation is among the most complex elements of a transit project and is frequently cited as a major cost and timeline driver. Old and inaccurate maps complicate efforts to identify utilities and lead to additional costs and delays to address unexpected site conditions. As a result, project sponsors need to dedicate enough staff with expertise in utility relocation. These staff should be brought on early in the planning phase and remain through the duration of construction. Project sponsors and utilities should sign agreements early in the project development process and relocate or identify as many utilities as practical prior to construction. Early utility identification and relocation yields significant cost and timeline savings throughout the course of a project’s construction. On the other hand, misidentification of utilities can lead to significant costs due to change orders and unexpected findings during construction.
Similar challenges exist with the land acquisition process, which can be lengthy and involve confrontations or disputes with communities along a project’s alignment. Early and prompt land acquisition can result in significant time and cost savings for projects. Since highway departments conduct land acquisition and utility relocation on a much more regular basis, transit project sponsors should work with staff at state DOTs to borrow staff experienced in utility relocation and land acquisition.
Standards
Third, building more and better transit demands a new framework for how we think about projects, the standards that are applied, and the policy environment in which they operate.
Customization should be deemphasized in favor of updated standardization to save on construction costs and speed up delivery.
Undeniably, transit investments—especially stations—help shape communities, neighborhoods, and define a community’s character. But this research found an overemphasis among U.S. decisionmakers to customize stations and vehicles when designs could be simplified and streamlined by standardizing components. The Copenhagen Metro, for example, used standardized station designs, equipment, materials, components, and off-the-shelf rail cars to minimize costs and allow for easy repairs. U.S. project sponsors, particularly those constructing new systems, should adopt vehicle and station designs from peer agencies to simplify design and trim costs.
Further, the longstanding U.S. approach to safety and other project standards should be revisited. Project sponsors, FTA, and transit constituency organizations should review existing construction standards to see if they can be more performance-based and useful in ways that can maintain safety but open avenues for more creative ways to meet them. To help inform such a review, the FTA and project sponsors should establish dedicated programs to exchange best practices on project delivery and station design, including but not limited to regular study tours. This involves looking at other countries beyond Western Europe, too, where great examples abound.
Transit projects in the United States need to maximize their public benefits.
When faced with escalating costs and community resistance, project sponsors in the United States often select routes that are significantly less expensive, do not interface with communities, nor require the intensive utility relocation often necessary for at-grade options along boulevards or other urban roadways. Project sponsors should weigh the tradeoffs between cost, complexity, and ridership when considering alignments. In doing so, project sponsors should enact a policy that clearly outlines when and how stakeholders can request project enhancement (“betterments”), include a process to evaluate whether to grant the request, and require the requesting entity to cover the cost in most circumstances. Community benefit agreements should be used to address community concerns and are useful when conducted early in the process.
Federal incentives are another powerful tool to enable project sponsors to increase the overall standards of their transit projects. For example, the federal Capital Investment Grants program needs to require minimum zoning densities or level of development around stations as a condition for federal funding. Similarly, federal evaluation needs to de-emphasize ridership as a key component of a project’s success and rely on accessibility metrics more often.
CONCLUSION
During this time of economic uncertainty, environmental concerns, and social anxiety, it is critically important we get the most out of our existing public investments. The dramatic changes foisted upon the nation as the result of the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the importance of public transit for essential workers, low-income riders, and neighborhood connectivity. While the federal government literally came to the rescue with emergency funding to keep most of these systems afloat, there is appropriate scrutiny now to make sure the projects we do undertake are successful both during the planning, construction, and implementation phases.
Our national goals around economic growth and opportunity, climate change, and social equity all mean we are going to need more and better transit than we have today. But we are not going to get more or better transit if we cannot figure out how to deliver projects in a timely and cost-effective way. As we consider transit investments in a new post-pandemic light, it is critically important our investments are as efficient as possible.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION
The desire to build infrastructure projects faster and cheaper has persisted since the earliest infrastructure projects were completed. Famous projects like the Hoover Dam, the Golden Gate Bridge, and the Empire State Building are celebrated for the speed in which they were completed, and the transcontinental railroad was literally a race to see which company could lay track the fastest.
Of course, those historic projects were all designed, built, financed, and governed under different circumstances and very different regulatory environments. The rules, procedures, and preferences that exist today at all levels of government are intended specifically to avoid the horrific way workers, the environment, and neighboring residents were impacted by infrastructure projects in the past, and to ensure that safety remains paramount for users. While those rules and regulations have certainly helped to achieve those goals, infrastructure projects have become so costly and take so long to build that few large projects are being built, especially for public transit. This is particularly disheartening when we examine other countries in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere that have similar standards but much lower costs.
But why? What can we learn from previous research and practice to understand how transit projects are delivered, the primary cost drivers, and impediments for their timely delivery?
This report answers these questions albeit with important caveats. For one, there is significant attention given to individual projects that take much longer than expected or experience cost overruns. We address those problems to a limited extent but are primarily interested in whether and why transit projects cost more and take long to deliver than international peers in the first place. As a result, this report focuses on overall project timelines and costs. Much of the existing work on cost and timeline drivers tends to be narrowly focused either on cost overruns, or on specific elements of project delivery. Recently completed subway projects in New York City, which are among the most expensive ever built, also receive a substantial amount of coverage given the outsized role public transit plays in that region. Other case studies often focus on a single transit line, region, or country, resulting in conclusions that are relevant to a particular area or specific project, but might not be broadly transferable. In addition, research conclusions on certain subjects—like delivery models— occasionally conflict.
This research and resulting policy recommendations aim to shift the current national conversation around transit project delivery from simply diagnosing problems to identifying and implementing opportunities to deliver better and more cost-effective projects. This report raises the level of discourse around project delivery by relying on comprehensive qualitative and quantitative findings, as opposed to idiosyncratic and isolated anecdotes. Lastly, the work directly informs federal decision-makers as they pursue reform-minded policies, as well as helps state and local actors more effectively invest in transit networks to grow local their economies, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and connect people to opportunity.
METHODOLOGY
To fully explore how projects are delivered, understand where the challenges occur, and develop solutions to overcome those challenges, this research employed an approach that had four distinct components, illustrated in Figure 1 (click to see an expanded image of the process).
The first step was to better understand the problem and where it was most acute. To do this, the Eno team created a construction cost database of 180 domestic and international rail transit projects completed over the past 20 years. The database is limited to examples in the United States, Canada, and Europe. The research team kept the geographical range to these countries and regions because of their comparable political culture, government structures, and infrastructure development and age.2 For each project, factors such as number of stations, grade alignment, station spacing, and mode, adjusted for purchasing power parity and inflation, allow for comparisons.
The database helps draw conclusions about the extent to which transit construction costs differ in the United States and peer countries, as well as sheds light on the differences between project characteristics and complexity across countries. The database informs the analysis in Section 3 and is also available for download to other researchers investigating similar topics.
A range of academic, media, industry, and government resources were used to obtain reported construction costs for all new lines entered into the database. It draws from official cost reports wherever possible, either from agencies or other entities directly responsible for construction. When using media reports, we aimed to confirm whether the same—or very similar—cost figure was used across other outlets. Additional project detail collected includes the year and month of groundbreaking and opening for service to the public, project length (kilometers and miles), number of stations, grade alignment (i.e. the share of total alignment that is below ground, at-grade, and above-ground), and station spacing (calculated as average miles between stations). The database also uses inputs from construction cost data collection from the Federal Transit Administration’s Capital Cost Database and by researchers Alon Levy and Eric Goldwyn at the NYU Marron Institute and Yonah Freemark via The Transport Politic.3
With the data showing a clear cost and timeline premium in the U.S., the next step was to better understand why. The research includes a thorough background assessment of existing documentation and previous research related to project delivery to understand key cost drivers and how they influence project outcomes. We evaluated reports, data, project-specific documents, and presentations from academic, research, and government sources. The documentation on project delivery we assessed spanned all phases from the preliminary idea and design phases through construction.
This report classifies cost and timeline drivers into three broad, interrelated categories with 11 specific topic areas, detailed in Section 4:
Governance
The public authorities that oversee transit project funding and construction in our federalist system. Includes how they function, the way they make decisions, and how they work with other public authorities and with the private sector.
Standards
The federal, state, and local rules and regulations that must be adhered to in order to achieve an overall policy goal directly or indirectly related to the project.
Processes
The procedures and practices that public and private staff undertake to build transit projects from conception to final completion. Includes the steps that must be followed, timelines, and tasks to be completed.
To fully understand how public transit projects are delivered, this report includes detailed case studies of nine regions in the United States, Canada, and Europe. These studies not only yield facts and details of the specific projects within those regions, but also uncover elements that may not otherwise be captured in the data, literature, or popular reporting. While each region is uniquely different, there are clear commonalities in project delivery across regions that determine cost and timeline drivers, and impact project outcomes. This report includes the following case study regions, detailed in Section 5:
- Domestic: Denver, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Seattle
- International: Copenhagen, Paris, Madrid, Toronto
- Highway case: I-495 HOT Lanes in Virginia
The case studies also help determine whether projects in the United States are being built to higher technical and safety standards than elsewhere, and to what extent factors like governance, institutional experience and staff capacity, project management, and contracting practices influence project outcomes. By identifying specific drivers as well as best practices in project delivery, the case studies inform the policy and practice recommendations in Section 6.
For this research, a case study is defined as a project or several projects delivered by an agency or agencies in a region, opened to the public between 2000 and 2020.5 This timeframe ensures that a project has a clear final cost and is also recent enough in interviewees’ memories that they can recall important details. For each of these cases, the lead agency in each region has completed at least two projects in the past 20 years. This allowed the research team to learn from an agency’s experience delivering multiple projects in a single region. Since this work is intended to inform transit project delivery in the United States, the international cases are limited to regions with comparable development patterns, economies, and governmental and legal structures.
The final cases also highlight comparable transit modes to what is typically constructed in the United States, specifically light rail. In particular, Paris and Madrid invested heavily in their regional tram systems, which provides direct comparisons to U.S. light rail projects. Domestic cases avoid outliers such as extremely expensive projects (like in New York City) that are unlikely to provide comparable lessons for other regions in the United States.6
A key part of the case study research was conducting interviews with stakeholders and experts in regions. The not-for-attribution interviews were not limited to organizations building rail transit, but also included other groups that have direct and indirect input to the governance, planning, and execution of capital projects. Specifically, interviewees included senior level representatives from the following types of organizations:
- Transit operators
- Transit oversight agencies, where applicable
- Metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs)
- City governments, including planning departments and officials in select cities
- State government, including officials from state departments of transportation
- The Federal Transit Administration and regional offices
- Academics with specialized knowledge in transportation and an understanding of the region
- Advocacy organizations and think-tanks, including riders’ unions, business groups, chambers of commerce, and other nonprofits
- Labor unions
- Former transit and government officials with specialized knowledge in transportation and an understanding of the region
The findings included in this report are almost entirely based on consistent information from multiple sources and interviewees.
As part of this project, the Eno team interviewed 117 individuals at 72 organizations.
While this methodology generated a set of findings that is inherently subjective, it also provided a level of insight not often found in the existing literature. Much of the agency-specific detail in the background and case studies is publicly available on the agencies’ websites, unless otherwise indicated.
Woven throughout the data analysis, background research, and case studies is consistent engagement with a high level, 22-person project advisory panel, consisting of experts from academia, industry, transit agencies, as well as state, local, and federal government. Eno consulted with the advisory panel before and during each major stage of this project, including case study selection, creation and release of Eno’s construction cost database, and development of our policy recommendations. Eno also convened separate sub-panels of representatives from labor unions and major design and engineering consultancies to gain further insight into various phases of project delivery and receive input on preliminary findings.
Insights and consistent themes that emerged from the research formed the basis of the takeaways and recommendations in Section 6. The recommendations also incorporate best practices that emerged from the literature review, case studies, Advisory Panel meetings, and discussions and feedback from additional interviews with experts and practitioners in various elements of project delivery such as environmental review, permitting, engineering, and labor, among others.
ANALYSIS OF TRANSIT CONSTRUCTION COST DATA
The following analysis is designed to help set the baseline for the systemic problem in the United States with high costs and long timelines associated with delivering transit capital projects. The data shows three important findings:
When evaluating transit projects, grade alignment has a stronger impact on costs than mode.
The United States pays a premium for rail transit that gets worse as projects get more complex, particularly for tunneled lines.
The United States takes longer to complete construction of rail transit projects than international counterparts, which also drives-up costs.
Section 2 of this report details the methodology for Eno’s capital cost database, but several points are important to reiterate because they are relevant to this analysis.
First, this analysis includes projects that have been completed between 2000 and 2020. There are some exceptions made on a case-by-case basis to include projects outside this range to help provide additional context and comparisons. Similarly, the database generally does not include projects that have not yet opened for service, but the database does include a few projects in Boston, San Francisco, and others that are set to open in 2021 because of their complexity and importance in the national discussion around transit project delivery.7
To compare projects across geographies and over time, the database adjusts costs so all project costs are compared in 2019 U.S. dollars. This is done with a two-step process. First, international reported costs were adjusted using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates for projects reported in non-U.S. currency. Currency conversions were based on the OECD’s PPP table, which documents conversion rates for international currencies to U.S. dollars in a given year, taking differing price levels between countries into account (measured as foreign currency needed to purchase $1 worth of goods).8
Then, projects were adjusted to 2019 dollars for inflation using the project’s midpoint. Instead of using a standard inflation calculator based on the consumer price index (CPI), the research team decided to use the Engineering News-Record (ENR) Construction Cost Index (CCI). The CCI is a more accurate reflection of buying power for construction as opposed to the CPI, which is based primarily on consumer spending in categories like healthcare, housing, and utilities. Eno also evaluated other indices, including several producer-price indices published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and decided that the ENR CCI was most applicable and appropriate for transit projects.9
Comparing as-built construction costs can offer some clues as to whether other countries are building public transit systems more cost-effectively. However, there are several caveats and challenges when attempting to make a true “apples to apples” comparison between domestic and international construction costs. The final output of the database is a comparable “unit cost,” in inflation- and currency-adjusted dollars per mile of rail line.
But not all projects and agencies are transparent in their cost reporting, and when they are, the data tend to be reported inconsistently. For example, some projects include costs not associated with the actual unit cost of mile of rail line. Elements like maintenance facilities or rolling stock are included in some projects, but not others. Worse, detailed cost breakdowns are typically not reported for most projects, and if they are, there may be vast differences in the categories used. For federally funded projects in the United States, regulations require agencies report cost breakdowns using nine Standard Cost Categories (SCCs), shown in Table 1.10.
TABLE 1: FTA STANDARD COST CATEGORIES

However, as the Eno team discovered when reviewing select cost breakdowns received through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, some agencies in the United States also use their own internal methodology to track costs, especially for projects that are locally funded. Rather than reporting project costs for items like stations, sitework, and stations, costs in some cases are broken down by project phase (i.e. preliminary engineering or final design). Cost breakdown methodologies between countries can also vary. Of the 26 projects in the database that have full cost breakdowns (all U.S. projects), 22 reported vehicles as part of the total cost, and 14 reported a maintenance or support facility. Land acquisition costs were reported in all 26 of the projects, indicating that these are likely included in most U.S. projects. The database does exclude the cost of maintenance facilities and rolling stock when available.
When comparing construction costs, it is important to avoid drawing sweeping conclusions or over-interpreting trends, though such comparisons will become richer with more data. Keeping these caveats in mind, the following takeaways will inform our research and spark additional questions that in-depth case studies can answer with more accuracy.
3.1 Grade alignment is much more correlated with cost than the mode of transit.
Defining “modes” of transit is a perennial debate, with inconsistencies across and within countries around the world. For the most part, the Eno capital cost database focuses on heavy rail and light rail transit projects. Most new transit infrastructure in the United States is light rail, so the database includes many international examples of light rail projects. In most cases, European trams are similar to U.S. light rail in their grade alignment (surface, tunneled, or elevated), stations, and vehicles.
The database does not include intercity rail projects (like California High Speed Rail or comparable international examples). The database also avoids U.S. streetcar projects, which rarely travel in their own right-of-way (ROW) and are often loops instead of bidirectional track, making cost comparisons difficult. Some commuter and regional rail projects were included, particularly if they involved building new infrastructure (and are thus like heavy rail). But many U.S. commuter rail projects, which primarily run from outlying suburbs to city cores, were also excluded from the database, as most of these projects were conversions of existing freight rail infrastructure for commuter rail service and include little new construction.
Defining the mode of a transit project—whether it’s light rail or heavy rail—does not correlate well with its construction cost. Most of the construction and planning inputs for both modes are the same, despite shorter trains and stations for light rail projects. A transit line, whether heavy or light, includes laying track, installing electrical systems, and building accessible stations. Therefore, when making cost comparisons, light rail is not inherently cheaper than heavy rail—it is only that light rail tends to be at-grade, while heavy rail is usually not, making the latter more expensive.
FIGURE 2: GRADE ALIGNMENT COMPARISON—U.S. AND NON-U.S.
3.2 The U.S. pays a greater premium as projects get more complex, particularly with tunnels and stations.
Figure 3 below plots project grade alignments (percent of total alignment that is at-grade) against costs-per-mile and illustrates how most U.S. rail transit projects in the database are built primarily at-grade in contrast to non-U.S. projects.
FIGURE 3: GRADE ALIGNMENT (PERCENT AT-GRADE) VS. COST-PER-MILE
Source: Eno Capital Cost Database
Note: The trendlines are not intended to represent or be interpreted as a linear regression, but rather to illustrate the general direction of construct costs as they relate to a project’s grade alignment.
Despite some successes domestically and some costly projects abroad, the United States in general pays a significant premium to tunnel, a dynamic that has also caught the attention of some trade publications.11 The database shows New York City’s Second Avenue Subway and 7 line extension cost $3.5 billion per mile and $3 billion per mile, respectively. Transit projects elsewhere in the United States are much less expensive than these two outliers. Many international projects are built primarily below-grade but have similar costs as at-grade projects in the United States.
TABLE 2: AVERAGE CONSTRUCTION COSTS PER MILE (USD)

Source: Eno Capital Cost Database
Note: Only four U.S. projects are within the 20-80 percent bucket and conclusions for that part of the dataset are limited
As Table 2 illustrates, there is a U.S. premium for both mostly at-grade and mostly below-ground projects, though the premium is higher for tunneled projects (particularly when including New York City). The tunneling premium can be seen more clearly in Figure 4 below by plotting projects’ share of below-ground alignment with their cost-per-mile, and excluding the two outlier projects in New York City.12 Not only is the cost trendline for U.S. projects steeper than for non-U.S. projects, but there is a sizeable number of fully tunneled international projects that were built at a comparable cost to at-grade U.S. projects in the $100-$300 million per mile range.13
FIGURE 4: PERCENT TUNNELED VS. COST-PER-MILE
Tunneling increases the complexity of a transit project, resulting in much more variability in costs. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of construction costs-per-mile by the share of project alignment below ground. There is noticeable, but not dramatic, variation in construction costs for mostly above-ground projects (<20 percent tunneled) in both the United States and abroad. However, costs can vary considerably for projects that are largely below ground (>80 percent tunneled).
FIGURE 5: COST VARIABILITY BY SHARE OF ALIGNMENT IN TUNNELS
Outside of the United States, where tunneled projects are more common, below-grade lines range from as low as $135-215 million per mile for fully underground tram and metro lines in Madrid and Toulouse, to as high as $500-900 million for subway projects in Barcelona and London (and some Parisian Metro lines). Tunneled projects in the United States range from $270 million to 1 billion per mile (and up to $3.5 billion for projects in New York City, which are excluded from the plot). There are significantly fewer U.S. tunneled lines in the database compared to international projects, and the presence of two large outlier projects in New York City further contributes to the dramatic variation in U.S. costs for tunneled projects. However, Current budgets and cost estimates for tunneled lines that are not in the database but are under construction or proposed are still significantly higher than most peer projects abroad, with a notable exception in Seattle.
- Seattle Light Rail Northgate Extension (4.3 miles, 3.5 miles in tunnels): $419 million per mile14
- Los Angeles Purple Line Extension Phase 1 (3.9 miles): $1.2 billion per mile (excl. vehicles)15
- Los Angeles Purple Line Extension Phase 2 (2.6 miles): $967 million per mile (excl. vehicles)16
- Los Angeles Purple Line Extension Phase 3 (2.6 miles): $1.4 billion per mile (excl. vehicles) 17
- Los Angeles Regional Connector (2 miles): $900 million per mile (excl. vehicles)18
- Downtown Austin Light Rail Tunnel (1.5 miles): $1.3 billion per mile19
If included in the database, these projects would still fall within the higher cost-range for U.S. projects. The U.S. tunneling premium, excluding New York City, would increase from 48 percent to 123 percent, reflecting an average construction cost of $771 million per mile, compared to $511 million per mile. These projects further reinforce the relatively high cost of building below-ground transit in the United States.
Some of the cost variation for tunneled projects can be attributed to factors like geological conditions (which vary considerably in each region and can significantly influence the cost and complexity of tunnel boring), technical specifications, tunnel depth, or station design (see Section 4.10). The detailed, regional case studies in Section 5 shed light on other governance or process-related elements that can affect construction costs, including project and contractor management, institutional expertise, permitting, and regulation.
Stations can also constitute a large portion of overall transit project costs and add more complexity to the projects. For tunneled projects in the United States, the database shows stations accounting for around 25 percent of total project costs. Research shows that station depth, size, and architecture is a significant project cost driver (see Section 4.10). But despite their generally lower cost per mile, international projects have more
and closer stations on average, which is usually more common and useful in denser areas. However, the database analysis shows station spacing does not seem to have a clear correlation with cost.
The database calculates the average distance, in miles, between stations.20 A high-level comparison of station spacing across U.S. and non-U.S. project suggests in Figure 6 that transit stations are spaced closer together abroad, especially for lines mostly at-grade, which have nearly a third of the distance between stations as at-grade U.S. lines. These at-grade lines—most of which are tram or light rail projects—often run through dense, historic city centers and are usually not grade-separated.
FIGURE 6: STATION SPACING VS. COST-PER-MILE
Comparing average station spacing of projects with their cost-per-mile does not indicate a relationship between station spacing and costs but suggests that European transit projects have higher station densities without a significant cost premium. This comparison, however, may not fully capture differences in technical complexity between U.S. and non-U.S. projects, particularly considering that some international tram lines might have more in common with mixed-traffic streetcars compared to fully grade-separated light rail in the United States.
3.3 Projects outside of the U.S. take longer to build, mostly because they are far more complex.
In addition to project costs, this database also includes information on project timelines—measured as groundbreaking and opening months and years. On average, non-U.S. projects in this database take slightly longer to build than U.S. projects (5 years abroad compared to 4.7 years in the United States).21 However, there are considerable differences in the time it takes to complete projects based on their grade alignment.
FIGURE 7: PERCENT TUNNELED VS. TIME TO COMPLETE (IN MONTHS), U.S VS NON-U.S. PROJECTS
Source: Eno Capital Cost Database
Note: This graphic excludes projects that took more than 150 months to construct. Additionally, the 20-80 percent tunneled bin in the U.S. has only four projects, which limits the takeaways of that portion of the data.
According to Figure 7, projects in the United States that are mostly at-grade take almost six months longer to complete, while projects that are mostly tunneled take more than 16 months longer to complete than comparable projects abroad. But the other countries represented in the database account for many more tunneled projects. In Figure 7, 41 of the 106 international projects are 80 percent or more tunneled, compared to only 8 of the 68 U.S. projects. (Section 5 explores why this is the case).
However, these project timelines only cover the construction period. While unexpected site conditions, scope changes, and other issues arising during construction can affect project timelines, many of the timeline drivers identified in this report, including preparatory sitework, utility relocation, the environmental review process, land acquisition, stakeholder engagement, and lengthy planning periods, are not captured in these timelines. Projects may be proposed in one form or another, but not formally become reality until years or decades later. It is thus difficult to pinpoint a precise and consistent “start” date for transit lines.
FIGURE 8: TIME TO COMPLETE VS. COST PER MILE
Though the metrics used do not capture the full timeline of a project, there is still a clear relationship between the time it takes to construct a transit line and its final construction cost across both U.S. and international projects. Some of the relationship between time and cost might be attributed to the complexity of a project and its alignments. However, within this database, there is little relationship between a project’s length or grade alignment and its timeline. There is also minimal variation in timelines for new lines compared to extensions of existing lines, though the most notable outlier, the North-South Line in Amsterdam, was a new build. Other complicating factors like the share of project in existing ROW, the density or level of development around the alignment, and geological conditions not captured by this database may further influence timelines. Nonetheless, these findings suggest project timelines themselves can be a significant driver of costs.
BACKGROUND: POTENTIAL COST AND TIMELINE DRIVERS
This section reviews 11 potential areas that have been identified as potential cost and timeline drivers for public transit projects. These cost drivers fall into roughly three categories: governance, processes, and standards. As illustrated in Figure 9 and throughout this section, there is clear overlap among these topic areas and the groupings are admittedly subjective. Nevertheless, they are helpful to understanding the complexities in delivering large transit projects and highlighting the differences between the United States and other countries.
FIGURE 9: CATEGORIES AND TOPICS OF MAJOR POTENTIAL TRANSIT COST AND TIMELINE DRIVERS
Also, there are terms that describe important actors in transit project delivery. While many terms, like transit agencies, state DOTs, and labor unions are self-explanatory, some terms are used in different ways by varying stakeholders. Figure 10 defines some of the entities frequently referred to in this section.
FIGURE 10: KEY ACTORS/TERMS IN TRANSIT PROJECT DELIVERY
4.1 Institutional Structure and Decision-making
Perhaps one of the most overlooked but most important issues in transit project delivery is institutional governance. Research shows that transit projects can suffer or fail due to lack of focus on establishing the institutional structures that will ultimately deliver and operate the project. The literature shows that setting a clear structure for organizational decision-making responsibility and coordination with other agencies and transportation modes is important to the success of a project.
In the federalist system of the United States, governance for transit is largely devolved to state and local governments which, in turn, develop their own unique way of organizing transit networks and the institutions that govern them. Transit capital projects are often carried out within the existing construction divisions of the same public authorities responsible for bus and rail operations. In some instances, independent special purpose delivery vehicles are used to deliver major projects. Most operating funds come from state and local sources, and federal grants cover a significant portion of capital projects, including rail transit expansions (see CIG summary above).
4.2 Project Delivery and Risk Assignment
Transit projects require the coordinated involvement of public and private actors with varying tasks, risks, and costs. For example, public transit agencies rarely own concrete plants or tunnel boring machines (TBM) and therefore rely on the private sector for design and construction. The scale and scope of the contractual relationship and delivery method between the public agency and private contractors can vary widely and directly affects project success. While there is extensive research on different models, there is no single method that is preferable in all cases, each with advantages and disadvantages.37
4.3 Procurement Specifications
How agencies legally obtain goods and services—from vehicles and parts to engineering and construction services—is a major element of any transit project. The FTA requires agencies to ensure full and open competition when procuring goods and services, as well as adopt written codes of conduct to prevent any emplo yee or board member with a conflict of interest from participating in the “selection, award, or administration of contracts.”78
4.4 Soft Costs and Change Orders
Transit project construction cost estimates inform a range of project aspects, including design, alignment, financing strategies, and community reaction. While there has been significant attention to the measurement of hard costs—physical elements of a project like vehicles, tracks, stations, and steel—soft costs are overlooked and understudied.
Soft costs typically encompass activities and services needed to plan, build, and start up a transit project aside from physical construction. Examples include design and engineering services, legal work, security and safety analyses, environmental review, risk assessment, cost estimation, administration, and project management.97 While few studies have directly analyzed the magnitude and scope of soft costs, research shows they have increased over time. There is no consensus on a specific source of increases but some research points to poor project management practices that lead to excessive change-orders, high contractor profit margins, long planning phases, unusual political influence, and project complexity.98
4.5 Utility Relocation
A major element of transit construction, particularly for rail projects, is the relocation of utilities along the proposed alignment. These may include power, water, gas, phone, internet, and sewer lines often owned by private sector enterprises with completely different goals and motives. Transit projects can cross utilities both above and below ground, requiring them to be moved vertically, horizontally, or both. It is among the most complex elements of transit projects, and one of the most common reasons cited for issues and project delays.12
4.6 Land Acquisition
The acquisition of land and ROW is necessary for any transit project and its route, grade alignment, stations, and maintenance facilities impact specific land needs and costs. Federal and state regulations, including eminent domain laws, environmental statutes, and other statutes governing the purchase of property for infrastructure projects, also influence the land acquisition process and costs.137
4.7 Environmental Review
A variety of federal laws, rules, and regulations govern environmental review of federally funded transit projects in the United States. Compliance with these standards falls under the process established in 1970’s National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), but also involve more than two dozen other federal statutes that span several federal agencies. NEPA acts both as a holistic method of determining the environmental impact of a federal undertaking and as a collection point for the many permits and consultations required under federal environmental law.158
4.8 Buy America
Mass transit procurements over $150,000 using FTA grant funds are subject to a “Buy America” requirement first adopted by Congress in 1978. Under 49 U.S.C. §5323(j), all “steel, iron, and manufactured goods used in the project” must be produced i n the United States. For rolling stock (including train control, communication, traction power equipment, and rolling stock prototypes), the standard is not quite as high— the cost of all components and subcomponents made in the United States must be at least 70 percent of the total cost for all rolling stock compon ents, and final assembly must have occurred domestically.209 The intent of Buy America is to leverage public infrastructure dollars to support and grow domestic manufacturing, but it has some potential cost and timeline consequences for transit projects.
4.9 Planning and Community Engagement
Planning helps decision-makers, elected officials, and the public translate goals and visions into a specific, prioritized projects for a region’s transit network. Planners at public agencies work with communities and other agencies to pursue projects that meet their criteria. This involves a multi-step process with frequent interaction with the public and demand models to predict future impacts.
4.10 Architecture and Design
Design specifications are a core element of any transportation project, and agencies often spend a significant amount of money on preliminary design. Design decisions determine whether a project is constructed at-grade, above-ground, or below-ground, along with the depth and size of stations. Other elements of station design include platform size and layout, vertical access (escalators and elevators), construction materials, and aesthetics.236 These specifications are informed by a range of factors including expected passenger capacity, environmental considerations, physical site characteristics, agency preference, and compatibility with existing systems, among many others.
4.11 Labor
Frontline labor is a major cost of any capital project. Workers are needed to prepare and install the materials to ensure a safe and long-lasting infrastructure system. But while labor is a major part of overall construction costs, outside of New York City there is little research comparing transit construction labor costs in the United States to places abroad or whether labor is a major cost driver that can be addressed through responsible changes in public policy. The wages, benefits, and work rules that are negotiated for unionized labor, which makes up the majority of the transit capital workforce, are typically embedded in construction contracts protected by nondisclosure agreements and are notoriously difficult to obtain.291
REGIONAL CASE STUDIES
The case studies in this report examine the facts and background of a project or several projects conducted in a region and examined their approach to governance, processes, and project standards. The research relies on discussions with public and private experts and stakeholders in each region to help identify best practices and problems in delivering projects. The case studies were selected in consultation with the project’s advisory panel, and included considerations of project complexity, geographic diversity, modal comparability, and other factors that can help identify cost and timeline drivers along with solutions to improve them.
The following cases are included in this section:
- Los Angeles
- Seattle
- Denver
- Minneapolis-St. Paul
- Copenhagen
- Madrid
- Paris
- Toronto
- Virginia’s I-495 HOT Lanes and the Silver Line
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION IN PROJECT DELIVERY
The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) is a modal agency under the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) and administers roughly $12 billion annually through its various grant programs. Fixed guideway (rail and bus rapid transit) projects receive approximately $2.3 billion through the agency’s Capital Improvement Grants (CIG).
The agency employs 550 full time staff across its Washington, DC headquarters and 10 regional offices. Each regional office includes an Office of Planning and Program Development, as well as an Office of Program Management and Oversight. Some of the larger regional offices with more transit activity like Philadelphia (Region 3) and San Francisco (Region 9) have an Office of Financial Management and Program Oversight that provides additional oversight and assistance. Staff sizes at the regional offices ranges from 15 to 40 employees.
Nearly all large transit infrastructure projects use federal resources as part of their funding package, necessitating interaction with FTA staff and complying with federal regulations. This is done primarily through FTA’s regional offices in the early stages of project development. FTA’s in-house staff is supported by project management oversight contractors (PMOCs) that are drawn from a nationwide network of private firms, selected by the FTA through a rigorous review, to provide oversight of major capital projects from conception to operation. These contractors focus specifically on project costs, schedules, expenditures, scope, risk, and safety.317 Transit agencies work closely with FTA staff to secure CIG funding and reach a record of decision on the federal environmental review. The FTA also conducts triennial reviews of grantee agencies, including their procurement practices, capital programs, financials, and compliance with Buy America, civil rights, and other requirements that come with Federal funding. Once funding and NEPA approval are secured, the FTA’s role in construction and operations diminishes.
Local agency staff mostly recall positive experiences working with FTA and benefit from their technical expertise. In particular, oversight and reviews by the FTA before the preliminary engineering phase help agencies better identify and resolve staff capacity constraints, third party and intergovernmental approvals and coordination, or other complications like utility relocations in advance, preventing potential delays. Some cited a lack of staff capacity at the FTA regional offices and distances between agencies offices and FTA offices resulting in slower decisions and inability to provide greater technical assistance.
AMERICAN CASE STUDIES
THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN PROJECT DELIVERY
Public transportation projects in Europe are largely planned, funded, and delivered at the national and local levels. However, the European Union plays a limited role in funding and overseeing select projects, as well as setting guidelines for environmental assessments. This funding and oversight role is handled by the European Commission, the EU’s executive branch. The Commission is organized into multiple departments and executive agencies according to policy area.407 The Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy oversees the segment of the EU budget that funds urban transportation projects, and consults with other DGs, including the DG of Mobility and Transport.408
The EU sets some high-level transportation policies aimed at meeting specific goals like decarbonization, adoption of new technology, and reducing disparities in economic development between member states.409 Among the more specific goals of the EU is the completion of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T).410 The EU provides funding and financing assistance to member states for TEN-T projects which are primarily cross-border rail and road projects. There are, however, some public transit projects that receive funding under this program. For example, Metro line 8 in Madrid, which provides a connection from the city center to the Madrid Airport, which is deemed an international connecting point for the TEN-T network. As a result, the European Union covered 76 percent of the project cost through its Cohesion Fund.411
The EU also sets general standards for formatting, processes, and environmental impacts to be considered through its Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA) directive (Directive 2014/52/EU).412 The EIA directive details the selection criteria that should be used to determine whether or not to prepare an environmental impact statement, including project characteristics, location, and the anticipated extent of potential impacts. The directive also requires public notices and consultation opportunities during various stages of the project development and environmental assessment phase.
While this directive specifies the general structure, form, and content of environmental impact statements, each member state is responsible for adopting its own law and process. The most recent amendment of this directive in 2014 instructed member states to streamline environmental reviews, enact time limits on the environmental assessment process, and simplify language to make EIA reports more accessible to the public.413
INTERNATIONAL CASE STUDIES
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION IN PROJECT DELIVERY
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) provides assistance and funding for states to design, build, operate, and maintain the national highway system (Federal-aid Highway Program).577 The agency is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and has a division office in every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, employing roughly 2700 staff in total.578 Division offices are often located in state capitals, where most state DOTs are also headquartered.
The total federal-aid highway budget is $41 billion per year and is largely distributed to state DOTs under existing formulas in federal law. Unlike transit CIG grants, most FHWA grants for large projects are not discretionary and state DOTs are responsible for selecting and evaluating projects that will receive federal funding.579 To be eligible, projects must be included in a state’s Statewide Transportation Improvement Program (STIP) and the MPO’s Transportation Improvement Program (TIP or RTIP), which lists the major transportation projects across all modes that are expected to need federal funding or approval.580
FHWA uses a risk-based methodology to determine which projects to dedicate additional oversight and technical assistance, including size, cost, schedule, and complexity.581 For these major projects, division offices develop a project-specific plan that documents the justification for and scope of the division office’s involvement. The division office will often embed its own staff into a project to provide technical assistance across multiple project phases. FHWA division offices are able to lend in-house expertise on ROW acquisition, environmental reviews, engineering, operations, freight, and finance. The co-location of state DOTs and FHWA division offices in the same city allows for regular meetings, knowledge-sharing, and cooperation between state and federal teams.
Under federal law, the Surface Transportation Project Delivery Program also allows states to assume NEPA review and approval authority (known as NEPA assignment).582 This eliminates the need for FHWA review and approval on specific projects, and help streamline the environmental review process. States may apply for NEPA assignment and, if approved, are bound by a memorandum of understanding with FHWA that must be renewed every five years. Seven states currently have NEPA assignment agreements with FHWA: Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Ohio, Texas, and Utah.
MULTIMODAL CASE STUDY
TAKEAWAYS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The preceding data, analysis, and case studies reveal major challenges with public transit cost and project delivery in the United States, outlined below. Especially at a time of economic and fiscal uncertainty as well as environmental and social anxiety, it is critically important we get the most out of our existing public investments and that those projects we do undertake are successful both during the planning, design, construction, and implementation phases.
However, this work also makes it clear that there is no silver bullet to cutting the costs and timelines of critical transit projects. It also finds that the responsibility for doing so does not rest solely on federal reforms, fixes at the agency level, or with private sector practice. Rather, the challenges are acute, complex, and multi-faceted and therefore the solutions are too. The recommendations below are based on that fundamental premise. They are organized around the governance/process/standards themes discussed in Section 2 and, similarly, there is overlap among the recommendations as well as their intended targets.
6.1 We need to get the institutions, oversight, and decision-making right. Governance does not usually garner the most attention, but it is paramount to the success of a project both at public agencies as well as with the private sector.
6.2 Some of the processes, procedures, and practices that public and private actors must undertake in order to build transit projects—from conception to final completion—are often too slow, cumbersome, or outdated. We need to make it easier to build more and better transit projects.
6.3 Building more and better transit demands a new framework for how we think about projects, the standards that are applied, and the policy environment in which they operate.
CONCLUSIONS
Our thorough review of project delivery reveals that inadequate governance, cumbersome processes, and outdated standards cost U.S. transit project dearly. While there is no single cause for high costs and long timelines, the compounding effects of these underlying issues creates an environment of inefficiency that results in fewer projects being built, shorter transit lines, and sub-optimal routing decisions that leave many systems underutilized. Implementing the changes necessary to tackle this problem will require a concerted effort at the federal, state, and local levels.
A common thread across the recommendations in this report is the lack of underlying political will to implement best practices. The United States suffers from a political climate that does not uniformly see investment in transit infrastructure as net positive. Instead, transit project sponsors spend much of their public outreach effort simply justifying their existence and the value of transit, rather than engaging on the details of a project. Public skepticism of transit investments results in broad community pushback, increased willingness to sue to delay or block projects, and more judges that are sympathetic to those lawsuits. The lack of broad public acceptance for transit also results in communities demanding mitigation for negative construction impacts rather than demanding faster timelines.
This stands in stark contrast to peer countries, where support for transit is much greater and often cuts across partisan lines. The successful subway expansion in Madrid was a product of socialist and conservative parties out promising each other on how much transit could be built in the region. The conversative party won regional elections on their promise to build more subway lines and were reelected due to their ability to meet their goals. While there are always detractors, broad support for transit allows communities to clamor and compete for projects, rather than trying to block them.
Changing the national mindset on transit investment is a monumental task and one that will take significant effort. Luckily, there are several important opportunities to help change the narrative on transit investments. Increasing environmental consciousness and a global need to cut greenhouse gas emissions are already expanding political support for transit investments, as is the growing focus on combatting racial and socioeconomic inequality. But most importantly, as more localities use their own funds to expand and invest in their transit networks, there will be a strong financial incentive for regions to change their approach to project delivery. By implementing best practices and making the changes necessary to effectively deliver major projects, project sponsors will be able to deliver more and better transit projects to the communities that need them.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Eno would like to express gratitude to Alice Grossman, Jeff Davis, and Katherine Idziorek for their research assistance, as well as Katie Donahue and Caroline Marete for their help reviewing and editing this report. Karen Price and Madeline Gorman also provided invaluable assistance preparing this report and accompanying digital materials for publication.
The Eno Center for Transportation would like to thank the following individuals for contributing their expertise, constructive feedback, and support as members of the advisory panel convened for this research initiative:
Adjo Amekudzi-Kennedy
Professor and Associate Chair, Global Engineering Leadership and Entrepreneurship, School of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology
Rabinder Bains
Chief Economist, Federal Transit Administration
Andrew Bata
Regional Manager, North America UITP
Allison Black
Senior Vice President & Chief Economist, American Road & Transportation Builders Association
David Carol
Chief Operating Officer, American Public Transportation Association
Aileen Carrigan
Principal & Founder, Bespoke Transit Solutions
Richard Clarke
Former Chief Program Management Officer,
Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Nuria Fernandez
Administrator, Federal Transit Administration
Eric Goldwyn
Research Scholar, New York University’s Marron Institute on Cities and the Urban Environment
Tracy Gordon
Senior Fellow, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center
Hani Mahmassani
Director, Northwestern University Transportation Center
Beth Osborne
Director, Transportation for America
Stephanie Pollack
former Secretary and CEO, Massachusetts Department of Transportation
Thomas Prendergast
Americas Transit Leader, AECOM
Edwina Smallwood
Economist, Federal Transit Administration
Christof Spieler
Senior Lecturer, Rice University
Raj Srinath
Former Deputy General Manager/Chief Financial Officer, Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority
Ali Touran
Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Northeastern University College of Engineering
Mia Veltri
Program Analyst, Federal Transit Administration
Carole Voulgaris
Assistant Professor of Urban Planning, Harvard Graduate School of Design
Charlie Zelle
Chairman, Metropolitan Council
The Eno Center for Transportation also wishes to thank the Merck Family Fund, TransitCenter, the Barr Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the John
Merck Fund for their generous support of this initiative. The Federal Transit Administration also provided financial support for this and future related work on transit costs and project delivery.